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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

DERRELL CRAIG DICKERSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20070643-CA

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

NATURE OF PROCEEDING AND STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free
zone, a second degree felony; possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A
misdemeanor; and criminal trespass, a class B misdemeanor.
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did Officer Francom reasonably suspect defendant and his companion had just been
trespassing on the Ogden Nature Center hiking trail, when he found them sitting in the only
car in the parking lot near midnight, within minutes of a citizen complaint, and with no other
individuals in sight?
The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying a trial
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, \
11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for

correctness, including its application of the legal standards to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004
UT 95,1{ 11, 103P.3d699.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. CONST, amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-206 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007-2008):

(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204
or a violation of Section 76-10-240 regarding commercial terrorism:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or
damage to any property, including the use of graffiti as defined
in section 76-6-107;
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the
safety of another;
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains
on property as to which notice against entering is given by: . . . (iii)
posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of
intruders [.]
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free
zone, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 5 8-3 7-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004
& Supp. 2007-2008); possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004); and criminal

2

trespass, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. 76-6-206(2)(a) (West
2004). Rl-2.
Motion to suppress denied. Defendant moved to suppress the drug evidence on the
ground that he was detained absent reasonable suspicion. R22-26. An evidentiary hearing
was held on 7 June 2007. See R61. The trial court orally denied the motion on 12 July 2007.
R63:2.
Conditional guilty plea. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, defendant pled guilty
as charged with the condition that he could challenge the trial court's ruling on appeal. Id.
at 3 ("[Wje're going to enter a Sery plea to each of those charges").1
Sentence. That same day, the trial court imposed concurrent terms of one-to-fifteen
years for the second degree felony, one year jail for the class A misdemeanor, and six months
jail for the class B misdemeanor. Id. at 10. See also R50-51 (Sentence, Judgment,
Commitment filed on 13 July 2007).
Timely notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on 1 August 2007.
R53.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
At approximately 11:10 p.m. on April Fool's Day 2007, Officer Francom of the
Ogden City Police Department was dispatched to the Ogden Nature Center, North annex,

]

See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988).

2

The facts are set forth in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying
the motion to suppress. See State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997).
3

located at approximately 1100 North Mountain Road in Ogden, Utah. R22; R61:4.3
According to the citizen complainant, "there were people running around behind some
houses in the foothills" at the nature center. R22 (quotation marks omitted).

These

individuals were reportedly "shooting paint ball guns, with flashlights, and stuff like that."
R61:4. "The complainant also said that there was a vehicle parked in the parking lot of the
[nature center]." R22 (quotation marks omitted); see also R35.
The nature center is operated by a private, non-profit company on land leased from
Ogden City. R41. It has no entrance fee, but is closed to the public from dusk to dawn.
R35,41. The nature center trail is enclosed by a chain fence that runs along Mountain Road,
and where it leaves Mountain Road, it is bordered by residential properties. R36. The nature
center parking lot is also fenced except for the entrance; at the rear of the parking lot is a
wooden arbor or entrance to the trail head that leads up behind the residential area. R36; see
also R61:5-6. This is the only entrance to the trail head. R36; see also R61:12. There is no
sign at the parking lot entrance indicating the hours that the nature center trail is open to the
public, but the hours are posted on a bulletin board near the wooden arbor located at the trail
head. R36; see also R61:13.
Officer Francom arrived in the area "no less than five to [ten] minutes" after being
dispatched. R61:4. He first drove up a roadway at the "back of the [nature center] trails"
that turned out to be a private driveway, and spoke with a local resident he found there.

3

A copy of the suppression hearing transcript is attached in addendum A. Copies
of the parties' memoranda filed below are attached in addendum B.
4

R61:4-5. The resident told Officer Francom "the approximate area he saw the individuals."
Id. at 5. Officer Francom drove back down the private driveway, onto Mountain Road, and
into the nature center parking lot where he saw a car "backed up in the center of the parking
lot" about "fifty feet" from the trail head. R61:7; see also id. at 5. Defendant was sitting in
the passenger seat and another individual was in the driver's seat. Id. at 7-10. No other
people or cars were present in the parking lot. Id.
Officer Francom approached both individuals and told them that they were
trespassing. Id. at 7-8. He asked for identification and ran warrants checks from his patrol
car. Id. at 9-10. Defendant had an outstanding felony warrant and was placed under arrest.
Id. at 10. As he handcuffed defendant, Officer Francom asked if he had "anything illegal on
his person," and defendant responded, "Yes, I have meth." Id. at 11. Officer Francom
reached into defendant's pants pocket and recovered the meth. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The totality of the facts confronting Officer Francom at the time of the warrants
checks here gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant and his companion were the
nature center trespassers. Officer Francom was dispatched to the nature center within
minutes of a citizen complaint that there were people running around on the nature center
hiking trail, that they were disturbing local residents withpaintball guns and flashlights, and
that there was a single car in the nature center parking lot. Except for the parking lot
entrance and entrance to the trail head, the nature center is enclosed by fencing and
neighboring residential properties. It was near midnight and the nature center is closed from
5

dusk to dawn. When Officer Francom arrived, defendant and his companion were sitting in
the only car in the parking lot; no one else was in the area. Given the relatively enclosed
confines of the nature center, these facts, viewed objectively, support the reasonableness of
Officer Francom's suspicion that he had found the nature center trespassers. The trial court's
reasonable suspicion ruling should therefore be upheld.
ARGUMENT
OFFICER FRANCOM REASONABLY SUSPECTED DEFENDANT AND
HIS COMPANION HAD JUST BEEN TRESPASSING ON THE NATURE
CENTER HIKING TRAIL WHEN HE FOUND THEM SITTING IN THE
ONLY CAR IN THE PARKING LOT NEAR MIDNIGHT, WITHIN
MINUTES OF A CITIZEN COMPLAINT, AND WITH NO OTHER
INDIVIDUALS IN SIGHT
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that his detention in the nature
center parking lot was supported by reasonable suspicion. Defendant disputes that there was
reasonable suspicion because he contends, "[t]here [is] nothing in the facts of this case that
would cause a reasonable person to believe that [djefendant had violated" the criminal
trespass statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-206 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007-2008). Aplt. Br.
at 12. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
Proceedings below. The parties stipulated below that Officer Francom relied on the
Ogden City trespass ordinance in detaining defendant. See R25. Defendant thereafter argued
that the officer had no reasonable suspicion to detain him for two reasons. Id. First, the
Ogden city trespass ordinance did not apply to the nature center. And second, even if it did,
the city ordinance required that "the time restrictions to be posted at the main entrance to the

6

park," and "there [was] no sign posted indicating the time restrictions for entrance" at the
entrance to the nature center parking lot. Id.
The State agreed that the city trespass ordinance did not apply to the privately
managed nature center. R41. The State argued, however, that the criminal trespass statute,
§ 76-6-206, did apply, and that the undisputed facts gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that
defendant was in violation of the statute. Id. at 41-42; see also R38-40.4
The trial court accepted the State's reasoning and denied defendant's motion to
suppress: "I find that—that based upon the facts, and each one of these cases[,] according to
the Supreme Court is determined on the facts, and I find that the facts are sufficient to deny
the motion, and I deny the motion to suppress." R63:2.
Controlling law. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
against unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20 (1968), the United States Supreme
Court observed that the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to mean that "police must,
whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the
warrant procedure . . . . " However, as in Terry, "we deal here with an entire rubric of police

4

The State's memorandum below inadvertently incorrectly cited to § 76-6-204,
rather than § 76-6-206.
7

conduct—necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer
on the beat—which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected
to the warrant procedure." Id. Accordingly, Officer Francom's on-the-spot decision to
detain defendant and his companion for warrants checks "must be tested by the Fourth
Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id.
In order to assess the reasonableness of a detention, courts must "'balanc[e] the need
to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.'" Id. at 20-21
(citations omitted). Terry recognized that the government has a legitimate interest in crime
prevention and detection. Id. at 22. As a result, the Court held, "a police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest." Id.
The Teriy stop, as it has come to be known, is justified "if the officer has a reasonable
suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot,' . . ." United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30); accord State v. Kohl,
2000 UT 35, If 11, 999 P.2d 7. In other words, a Terry stop may not be based on "inarticulate
hunches." Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. On the other hand, "the likelihood of criminal activity need
not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying
a preponderance of the evidence standard." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274
(2002). Indeed, an officer is under no obligation to rule out innocent conduct prior to
initiating a detention. State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ^f 17, 112 P.3d 507 (citing Arvizu, 534
8

U.S. at 277). "This is because the public interest in investigating criminal activity is
sufficiently important to justify the minimal intrusion into personal security that such
investigatory detentions entail." Id. (citing Arvizu, at 534 U.S. at 273). Simply put, there
need only be articulable facts from which an officer can reasonably infer that criminal
activity "may be afoot." See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
When examining an investigatory stop, "it is imperative that the facts be judged
against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken
was appropriate?" Id. 21-22 (citations omitted). Moreover, in assessing reasonable
suspicion, "[cjourts must view the articulable facts in their totality and avoid the temptation
to divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation [from each other]." Markland, 2005 UT 26,
Tf 10 (case citation and quotation marks omitted). In other words, reasonable suspicion must
be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time.
See State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, f 14, 147 P.3d 425 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274).
"Courts must... 'judge the officer's conduct in light of common sense and ordinary human
experience and . . . accord deference to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent
and suspicious actions.'" Markland, 2005 UT 26, ^f 11 (quoting United States v. Williams,
271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)); accord State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,ffif20-21, 78
P. 3d 590 (holding that courts should consider an officer's subjective assessment of the facts).
This Case. Applying the reasonable suspicion standard here, the totality of the facts
confronting Officer Francom at the time of the warrants checks gave rise to a reasonable
9

suspicion that criminal activity involving defendant "may be afoot" at the nature center.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Indeed, far from an inarticulate hunch, Officer Francom's brief
detention of defendant was based on objective facts: (1) a reliable citizen complaint that
people were running around on the nature center hiking trail, that they were disturbing local
residents with paintball guns and flashlights, and that there was a single car in the nature
center parking lot, see R22; (2) the nature center property is enclosed by fencing as far as it
extends along Mountain Road, and where it departs from Mountain Road, it is enclosed by
some neighboring residential properties, see R36; (3) the parking lot is also enclosed by
fencing except for the entrance and the arbor over the trail head, see id; (4) it was near
midnight and the nature center trail is closed from dusk to dawn, see R35-36; (5) defendant
and his companion were sitting in the only car in the parking lot within minutes of the
complaint, see R61:4-9; and (6) no one else was in the area, see id. at 7. These facts, viewed
objectively, support a reasonable inference that a criminal trespass was afoot.
Indeed, the criminal trespass statute prohibits " annoy [ing]," "damaging]," and
"reckless" conduct like that reported here. See § 76-6-206(2)(a). Given that the nature
center is a relatively confined area, and that defendant and his companion were the only
people in sight at the nature center, within minutes of the citizen complaint, it was reasonable
to suspect that they were the hiking trail trespassers. Moreover, because it was reasonable
to suspect that defendant and his companion had just come off the nature center hiking trail,
it was also reasonable to assume that they had seen the bulletin board at the trail head listing
the nature center's hours of operation. See § 76-6-206(2)(b)(iii) (prohibiting entry of
10

property "as to which notice against entering is given by: . . . posting of signs reasonably
likely to come to the attention of intruders").
Notwithstanding the above, defendant asserts that "nothing in the facts of this case []
would cause a reasonable person to believe that [djefendant had violated [this] statute." Aplt.
Br. at 12. But defendant ignores the common sense inference drawn by the reliable citizen
who reported that there were people trespassing on the hiking trail and that there was a car
in the nature center parking lot. See Aplt. Br. at 14 ("There is nothing in the record to
suggest that this person was not reliable"). When Officer Francom entered the nature center
parking lot moments later and found defendant and his companion sitting in the only car
parked therein—with no other individuals in sight—he drew the same commonsense
inference the citizen complainant had drawn: The individuals in the car were the same people
that had moments earlier been disturbing local residents on the nature center hiking trail. See
Markland, 2005 UT 26, ^| 25 (finding reasonable suspicion where there was a
"contemporaneous report of suspicious circumstances in the area in which Markland was
detained"). See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,145-46 (1972) (upholding finding of
reasonable suspicion where reliable informant provided information—"an individual seated
in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist"—that "was
immediately verifiable at the scene").
Although defendant's presence in the nature center parking lot could have been
innocent, as noted above, police officers are under no obligation to rule out innocent conduct
prior to initiating a detention. Markland, 2005 UT 26, \ 17 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277);
11

see also State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, U 11, 47 P.3d 932 ("officers need not close their
eyes to suspicious circumstances" (case citation and quotation omitted)). The Fourth
Amendment "accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people." Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000). Where, as here, reasonable suspicion exists, officers are
permitted to "detain the individuals to resolve [any] ambiguity." Id. at 125.5 Thus, while
there may have been an innocent explanation for defendant's after-hours presence in the
nature center parking lot, the objective facts support the trial court's determination that
Officer Francom reasonably suspected that criminal activity was afoot.

5

Defendant also asserts that Officer Francom "stopped [him] based on his mistaken
belief that this parking lot was a city park, and [he] was in violation of the city park
ordinance." Aplt. Br. at 12; see also id. at 15. As noted above, the parties stipulated that
the city trespass ordinance did not apply to the nature center. R25. Consequently, it did
not figure into the trial court's ruling. R63:2. Defendant did not in the trial court and
does not on appeal rely on State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, 988 P.2d 7. Friesen held
that an officer must "know what the law is and what it prohibits," or else "the officer has
no basis upon which to make or defend [the action taken]."' Id. at \ 14. By not citing
Friesen in his brief, defendant forecloses any reliance on that case as a basis for reversing
the trial court's reasonable suspicion ruling. Moreover, defendant's non-reliance on
Friesen renders irrelevant Officer Francom's erroneous belief that the city trespass
ordinance applied to the nature center. Thus, the only question on appeal is whether there
was reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant and his companion violated the
criminal trespass statute. If the Court answers this question in the affirmative, it must
affirm.
In any event, Friesen was wrongly decided. The State has accordingly asked the
Court to overrule or disavow Friesen in an unrelated case. See State v. Applegate, Case
No. 20070507-CA, Brief of Appellee at pp. 16-26, filed on 10 January 2008. This Court
has since certified Applegate to the Utah Supreme Court for disposition. See State v.
Applegate, Case No.20070507-CA, Order dated 13 February 2008. If defendant had
raised Friesen here, the State would have similarly moved to certify this case to the Utah
Supreme Court.

12

CONCLUSION
The trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress should be affirmed, as should
be defendant's convictions for drug and paraphernalia possession, and criminal trespass.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ^{February 2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

^dMju~J&MU^__
MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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RANDALL W. RICHARDS
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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2

P R O C E E D I N G S
State of Utah versus Derrall Dickerson,

THE CLERK:
071900647.

This is time set for a suppression hearing.

MR. DECARIA:

Your Honor, I have a memorandum to

file with --

THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. DECARIA:

-- the Court today.

Actually

(unintelligilDie) .

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Ready to proceed to take

evidence in this matter?

MR. DECARIA:

We are, Your Honor.

I would call

J

Officer Jareid Francom to the stand.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Bouwhuis , you1re ready to proceed?
MR. BOUWHUIS :

We are.

housekeeping , Your Honor.

Just a -- just a matter of

Our intention today is just to

take brief testimony from the officer, and then we'll argue
the case later.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Bo th briefs have now

been filed.

JARED FRANCOM,
b sing firs t duly sworn,
was examined and testified as f ollows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056

3

BY MR. DECARIA:
Q.

You're Officer Francom with the Ogden City Police

Department.

Is that correct?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And on the 2nd of April of this year you were

dispatched to investigate some noise and disturbance in the
neighborhood of, I guess, 1100 North Mountain Road.

Is that

correct?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Describe what the nature of the dispatch actually

was.

What were you informed?
A.

We were informed that there was a disturbance

happening in the hills behind some residences.

Some people

thought that they heard some kids running around back there,
shooting paint ball guns, with flashlights, and stuff like
that.
Q.

Okay.

So after receiving that dispatch, how long

did it take you to get to the area?
A.

Probably no less than five to 10 minutes, somewhere

in there.
Q.

Okay.

Five to 10 minutes?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And where did you go?

A.

At first I drove up a roadway that cut up to the

back of the trails, which I later found out was a private

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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driveway when I met the resident of the house.

He told me

about the approximate area he saw the individuals.

I then

drove down his driveway back out onto Mountain Road and went
to the nature center parking lot.
Q.

Okay.

The nature center parking lot —

describe the

approximate address of that location.
A.

ItTs approximately 1100 Mountain Road -- North

Mountain Road.
Q.

Okay.

Now, describe the way that's laid out.

Is --

have you been to that area before on that -- than that
night -- other than that night?
A.

I've been in that area, but I have not been to the

nature center.
Q.

Okay.

There's a parking lot there.

Is that

correct?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

All right.

A.

ItTs on the east side of Mountain Road.

there.

Is that where you proceeded?

Now, describe the parking lot.
You pull in

There's a gate all the way around it except for the

entrance there that allows you to enter.

And then behind the

parking lot are some trails that you go back behind.
(Counsel confer.)
MR. DECARIA:

Are these your photographs?

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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MR. BOUWHUIS:
Q

They are.

You can use them.

(BY MR. DECARIA) With regard to the trails, are

those trails connected with the nature center?
A.

As far as I know, yes.

Q.

And how would you know that they were connected with

the nature center?
A.

I just —

I -- as far as I know, they are.

ITm not

sure how they are connected.
Q.

Okay.

Are those trails also the trails that might

proceed up around the back side of the homes that -- where
the neighbors called?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

So in order to get behind the homes that

you're describing, is the main access to that -- those trails
at that particular sort of trailhead?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

A.

As far as I know, yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

Now, is that a trailhead, as far as you know?

What is your knowledge as to what the

restrictions are on trailheads?
A.

As far as I know, no one is to be in a trailhead

from dusk —
Q.

I'm sorry, from dark until dusk.

Okay.

So the open hours are from day -- daylight

hours.
A.

Correct.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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Q.

From dawn until dusk --

A.

Correct.

Q.

-- is that correct?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I did.

Q.

And where was the vehicle parked?

A.

The vehicle was backed up in the center of the

So did you see a vehicle in that parking lot?

parking lot, not in any parking stall particularly, facing
Mountain Road.
Q.

Facing Mountain Road?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And how far from -- I mean, just if you can estimate

in feet, from access

to those trails?

A.

Fifty feet.

Q.

And did you contact individuals associated with the

vehicle?
A.

I did.

Q.

How many individuals were either there by the

vehicle or in the vehicle?
A.

There was two.

Q.

Were they in the vehicle at the time?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Were the doors opened or closed?

A.

They were both closed.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

I first contacted the driver.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

Yes, sir.

5

Q.

How did he identify himself?

6

A.

State ID, I believe, or driver's license.

7

And who did you contact first?

And was he identified to you?

I

can' t -- one of those two.
can't
Q.

Okay.

9

A.

Yeah, he had a driver's -- identification card.

10

Q.

And for what purpose did you contact the driver?

11

A.

Well, I contacted the driver because to the best of

12

my knowledge those individuals were trespassing in a city

13

park after dark.

14
15

Q.

Okay.

So in other words, your understanding is that

trailheads are essentially city park?

16

A.

Yes, sir.

17

Q.

And that if someone is in there that they're

18

trespassing if the -- if they're beyond -- previous to

19

dusk -- I mean, beyond dusk and before dawn?

20

A.

Yes, sir.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

I did.

23

Q.

Okay.

24
25

Did you inform the driver of that?

And did you then contact the passenger of the

vehicle as well?
A.

Yes, sir.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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And how did you do that?

A.

Just walked around the car and -- let's see.

Yeah,

as far as I remember, I walked around the car and just
gathered his information as well.
across.

I may have just leaned

I don T t remember.

Q.

Okay.

Through the driver's side window?

A.

Right.

Q.

Okay.

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Did he identify himself to you?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

Did you actually get ID from that passenger?

And after he identified himself, what did you

then do?
A.

At that point I went back to my patrol vehicle, ran

both of individuals1 identification through the system.
Q.

Okay.

Now, you didn't have identification for the

passenger, but you had formal ID, driver's license or
whatever, in your hand from the driver.
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Okay.

Is that correct?

So at that point they weren't free to leave.

So you got on your computer -- how did you

verify identification and whatnot?
A.

I just ran both names and date of birth they gave

me, the one from the identification card, the other one by

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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1

what the passenger told me.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

And there was actually a mugshot located on file for

4
5
6

the passenger to verify that he was who he said he was.
Q.

Okay.

Referring strictly to the passenger, then,

you ran his name and date of birth?

7

A.

Yes, sir.

8

Q.

And you got identification which included a

9

photograph.

Is that correct?

10

A.

Correct.

11

Q.

And did the photograph when you saw it on your

12

computer screen appear to be the person that you had

13

contacted?

14

A.

Yes, sir.

15

Q.

Okay.

16
17
18

So at that point did you learn something

about this individual?
A.

Yes, sir.

I learned that he had a felony three, no

bail warrant from the Board of Pardons.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

At that time I recontacted the passenger, and he was

21

So at what -- at that time what did you do?

taken into custody.

22

Q.

You took him into custody right then?

23

A.

Yes, sir.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

Now, as part of the normal custody, did you

search the individual?

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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A.

I did.

Q.

And did you find something on him that you believed

to be contraband?
A.

I did.

Q.

Where did that -- was that in the parking lot where

that was found?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And how did you find it?

A.

It was on his -- it was in his pants pocket when I

was searching him.
Q.

Okay.

Did you find it or did he find it?

J

A.

He identified it to me, and then I found it where he

said it was.
Q.

So how did he identify it to you?

A.

I asked him if there was anything illegal on his

person while I was handcuffing him.

He said, Yes, I have

meth.
Q.

Okay.

So then you reached in, you found it, you

pulled it out?
A.

Correct.

1

Q.

And you had seen substances like that before?

1

A.

Yes, sir.

1

Q.

That you knew to be meth?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

Did you believe that to be meth at that time?

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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A.

I did.

Q.

Okay.

He was arrested on a warrant.

Did you also

book him on possession of methamphetamine?
A.

I did.

Q.

Okay.

I want to show you some pictures.

We've sort

of moved beyond it, but I want to show you some pictures that
are mark<sd for the purpose of identification and ask if you
recognize these.

These are marked as State's exhibits

although they're actually defendant's copies of these
photographs.

Do you recognize that?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And what is that?

A.

That's the trailhead parking lot.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yeah, that's where you come in off Mountain Road

J

This may be a better view of it.

This is No.

2?

right there.
Q.

Okay.

A.

The entrance to the trailhead is part, I believe.

Q.

That's the entrance -- the actual entrance to the

trailhead.

And then this is No. 3.

What is this?

You have to walk under that -- that facility --

it looks like an arbor of some sort -A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

-- to get on there?

another picture of same thing.

Okay.

Thank you.

No. 4,

Is that right?

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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A.

Yes , sir.

Q.

And No. 5 may be the same.

A.

Yes , sir.

Q.

Are there any markings there that say anything about

Is that correct?

the hours, or did you see -- whether they1re in the
photographs or not, did you see any signs that talk about the
hours?

1

A,

No, sir.

Q.

So iwhatever the hours are is just based upon your

understandin g about what trailheads are.
A.

J

Correct.

J

MR. DECARIA:

Okay.

I have no further questions of

the witness <except to ask that these items be admitted into
evidence.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:

No objection.

Thank you.

MR. BOUWHUIS:

I

They are received.

You still have the photos?

THE WITNESS:

No, sir.

MR. DECARIA:

Do you want me to get them back?

MR. BOUWHUIS:

Yeah, if you could just hand them to

the witness, please.
THE WITNESS:
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Thank you.
You know what?

Actually I don ! t have

any questions, Your Honor.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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THE COURT:

Thank you.

You may stand down.
Mr. DeCaria?
MR. DECARIA:
THE COURT:

Nothing further, Your Honor.
Mr. Bouwhuis?

MR. BOUWHUIS:

As I indicated earlier, Your Honor, I

just -- I ju.3t received his -- his brief on this.

We've

decided to tcake testimony today, but I would like an
opportunity 1to review that and then argue on another
occasion.
THE COURT:

Okay.

How much time?

When do you want

'this set?
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Whatever your calendar will

accommodate, couple of weeks.
THE COURT:

Mr. DeCaria?
ItTs fine with the State, Your Honor.

MR. DECARIA:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

We ! ll set this, then, on the

28th, nine o Tclock.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:

2 8th?

June.

MR. DECARIA:

I apologize.

I will not be here on

the 28th.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:

21st of June.

Okay.

The Court will retain these pictures in

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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the file,
Mr. Dickerson, Ifll see you back here then,
(End of proceedings.)
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STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WEBER )
I, DIANE W. FLANAGAN, RPR, Official Court Reporter
in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the
foregoing is a true and correct transcription from the
videotape recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled
matter.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or
employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a
relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or
financially interested directly or indirectly in this action,

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
seal of office at Ogden, Utah, this 8th day of August, 2007.

Diane W. Flanagan
U
Official Court Reporter
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Addendum B

SECOND DISTRICT COURT

MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS - 6498
Attorney For Defendant
2564 Washington Blvd., Suite 201
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: (801) 393-6452
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
vs.
DERRALL CRAIG DICKERSON,

Case No. 071900647
Judge Parley R. Baldwin

Defendant.

COMES NOW the defendant, Derrall Craig Dickerson, by and through his attorney of
record, and hereby submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
his Motion to Suppress.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
On the evening of April 1, 2007, at about 11:10 p.m., Officer Jared Francom of the Ogden
Police Department was dispatched to the Nature Center located at 1100 North, Mountain Road,
in Ogden, Utah. A refused complainant had reported that "there were people running around
behind some houses in the foothills. The complainant also said that there was a vehicle parked in
the parking lot of the Nature Center."
limn urn mi mil win ••»» »•» •»» «»• ••'« , , u
CD19624989
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When Officer Francom arrived, he made contact with two individuals sitting in the
vehicle. Defendant was a passenger. Officer Francom informed the passengers that they were
trespassing because it was after dark, then ran their names for warrants. Defendant had a warrant
for his arrest, and Francom arrested him. Francom asked Defendant if he had anything on his
person Francom should know about, to which Defendant replied that he had some
methamphetamine, which was indeed found on his person.
Defendant was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance (DFZ), Second Degree
Felony, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (DFZ), Class A Misdemeanor.
ARGUMENT
The fourth amendment provides that M[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . ..
."U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The Utah Supreme Court has held that there are three levels of policecitizen encounters, each of which requires a different degree of justification to be constitutionally
permissible.
(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable
suspicion" that the person has committed or is about to commit a
crime; however, the "detention must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop;"
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause
to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v.
Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984)). To pass muster under the fourth amendment, the

2

seizure must be based on specific articulable facts which, together with rational inferences drawn
from them, would lead a reasonable person to conclude the defendant had committed or was
about to commit a crime. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987).
The United States Supreme Court first articulated the requirement that an officer must
have a reasonable suspicion to stop a person in Terry v. Ohio, U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The Court in Terry stated:
In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able
to point to specific and articulable facts which taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion . . . In making that assessment it is imperative that the
facts be judged against an objective standard . . . . Anything less
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a
result this Court has consistently refused to sanction.
Id. at 21-22. The requirement of reasonable suspicion has also been codified in Section 77-7-15,
Utah Code Annotated (1990):
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has
a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed, or is in the act
of committing, or is attempting to commit a public offense, and
may demand his name, address, and an explanation of his actions.
Under this section, a police officer may detain an individual if he or she has an articulable
suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring. State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616,
617-18 (Utah 1987). There is no bright line test for what is, or is not, reasonable suspicion.
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988). Whether the officer had reasonable
suspicion depends on the "totality of the circumstances. Id. The "totality of the circumstances"
analysis must be based upon all the circumstances and must "raise a suspicion that the particular
individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418,
3

101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.
1991).
In this case, Officer Francom responded to the scene and approached the defendant based
on his belief that a city trespassing ordinance applied to that particular location and that the
defendant was in violation of that ordinance. Ogden City does indeed have a trespassing
ordinance which makes it unlawful for persons to enter city parks at any time from one hour after
sunset to one hour before sunrise. Ogden City Ordinance 11-3-2. The ordinance also requires
that the time restrictions be posted at the main entrance to the park. (A copy of this ordinance is
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "A").
This particular location, however, has two problems that render the trespassing ordinance
inapplicable: 1) the Nature Center appears to be more of a trailhead than a city park,1 and 2) there
is no sign posted indicating the time restrictions for entrance. (See copies of photos of the area,
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "B").
At the time the preliminary hearing in this matter was waived, the State stipulated that the
officer, if called to testify, would say that he does not recall seeing a "no trespassing" sign
posted, but was relying on the city trespassing ordinance in responding to the scene and "seizing"
the defendant.

x

The question of whether the location at issue is a trail head or a city park is probably
moot for purposes of this motion, however, because the ordinance requires the time restrictions
to be posted at the main entrance to the park. Therefore, if the location is a park, the ordinance is
not met because there is no sign posted. If it's not a park, a sign need not be posted because the
trespassing ordinance does not apply.
4

CONCLUSION
The sole basis for Officer Francom's suspicion of criminal activity was his belief that the
city's trespassing ordinance applied to the area and the defendant's presence in the area. This
belief, however, was not reasonable because Ogden City's trespassing ordinance does not apply:
either the area was not a city park, or the required time restrictions were not posted.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant asks that the evidence obtained as a result of the
illegal stop be suppressed and that the charges be dismissed, "If a seizure occurs and the police
are unable to point to specific and articulable facts that justified that seizure, the seizure violates
the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, and evidence obtained as a result of the
illegal seizure must be excluded." " State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). See also
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417 (1963) (Evidence obtained
subsequent to an illegal stop should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree.")
DATED Qds/4> day of May 2007.

^

MICHAEL D. BOUWHSSJT
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I mailed or hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing,
with postage prepaid thereon, to Weber County Prosecutor, 2380 Washington Blvd., 2nd FL,
Ogden UT 84401, this / / > day of May 2007.

Secretary
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EXHIBIT "A"
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11-3-2: TRESPASSING ON CITY PARKS, CEMETERIES AND GOLF
COURSES:
A. Parks: It is unlawful for any person to enter or be upon any City park at any time from one
hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise, except when participating in or attending an
activity sponsored by the City or allowed under a permit issued by the City, and except for
persons crossing a park on a regularly established walkway.
B. Cemetery: It is unlawful for any person to enter or be upon the City cemetery at any time
from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise, except for the day before Memorial
Day and Memorial Day, when the hours when no person shall enter or be upon the City
cemetery shall be between ten o'clock (10:00) P.M. and four o'clock (4:00) A.M.
C. Golf Courses: It is unlawful for any person to enter or be upon the City golf courses between
the hours often o'clock (10:00) P.M. and four o'clock (4:00) A.M.
D. Posting Of Time Restrictions: The time restrictions shall be posted at the main entrance to
the park, cemetery, or golf course.
E. Violation; Penalty: A violation of this Section is a Class C misdemeanor, subject to the
penalties provided under Title 1, Chapter 4 of this Code.

(1979 Code § 9.03.020; Ord. 98-46, 6-23-1998)
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WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
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TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
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Plaintiff,

STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

vs.

]

DERRALL CRAIG DICKERSON,

]i

Case No. 071900647

)\

Judge: Parley R. Baldwin

Defendant.
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COMES NOW, Mark R. DeCaria, Weber County Attorney, and respectfully submits this
Memorandum of Law to support the State's Objection to Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Evidence.
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FACTS
The Arrest
Near midnight1 on April Fool's Day (April 1, 2007), Officer Francom responded to a
trespassing complaint that there were people running around behind houses in the foothills by
Mountain Road. Additionally, the complaint reported a vehicle parked in the Ogden Nature
Center, North (ONCN) parking lot. Upon arrival, Officer Francom viewed a vehicle parked in the
ONCN parking lot, just as the caller had described. Two men occupied the vehicle. Officer
Francom approached the two males, informed them that they were trespassing, and asked them
both for identification. The vehicle's passenger did not have identification but verbally identified
himself as Derrall "Craig" Dickerson. Upon running Dickerson's name, Officer Francom found
that Dickerson had a warrant for his arrest.2 Officer Francom arrested Dickerson and later found
methamphetamine on his person.
Ogden Nature Center, North
The ONCN3 is an annex of the Ogden Nature Center (ONC)4. Both the ONC and ONCN
are maintained and operated by a private, non-profit company on land that is leased to them by
Ogden City. The ONC has limited hours of operation and an entrance fee. The ONCN also has
limited hours of operation—closed from dusk until dawn.

1

23:10 Hours
In total, Dickerson had an NCIC hit, a felony three no bail warrant for his arrest from the board of pardons,
and a misdemeanor warrant from Weber county.
3
Located at 1175 N. Mountain Rd., Ogden, Utah 84404. The ONCN is just North of where Harrison Boulevard
becomes Mountain Road.
4
Located at 966 W. 12th Street, Ogden, Utah 84404.
2

-2-

There are two signs near the ONCN entrance indicating that the area is part of the
ONC—one at the main entrance to the parking lot and another on a wooden recycle bin near the
park's entrance. The parking lot is surrounded by a wooden fence, and the rest of the trail along
Mountain Road is blocked by a chain fence. The wooden fence surrounding the parking lot opens
for a wooden arbor—the entrance. The trail is only accessible through the entrance beyond the
parking lot. Just through the arbor there is a bulletin board on which there is a sign that reads,
"The park is open from dawn until dusk." Other than the ONCN trail, the area around Mountain
Road is residential with some properties boarding the ONCN property.
ARGUMENT
I.
OFFICER FRANCOM'S STOP AND SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS
REASONABLE UNDER THE 4 TH AMENDMENT
The 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the
14th Amendment and adopted by the Utah State Constitution, only protects persons against
searches and seizures that are unreasonable.1 US. Const. Amend. IV. Utah Const.Art. I, § 14.
Utah v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994). A reasonable search and seizure balances the
competing interests of a citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy against law enforcement's
legitimate interest in crime prevention and investigating criminal activity. State v. Whittenback,
621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980). State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Whether a search
and seizure is reasonable is determined by a fact-intensive inquiry guided by a two-part analysis:
(1) whether the officer's actions were justified at their inception and (2) whether the resulting
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." U.S. Const
Amend. IV. Utah Const. Art. I, § 14.
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detention was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in
the first place. Lopez at 1132.
At issue here is whether a stop and seizure of a person, the defendant, was reasonable.
There are three levels of reasonable, constitutionally permissible police to public encounters
which may qualify as a seizure of a person: (1) an officer may approach a citizen and ask
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person
if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has, is, or is about to commit a
crime, and so long as the detention is temporary and lasts no longer than necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop; and (3) an officer may arrest a suspect so if the officer has probable cause
to believe that the person has, is, or is about to commit a crime. State v. Dietman, 739 P. 2d 616,
617 (Utah 1987).
A level two encounter is at issue here as the question presented is, first, whether Officer
Francom had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and question the defendant, and, second,
whether Officer Francom acted within the reasonable scope of the stop in running a warrants
check on the defendant. Both questions are answered in the affirmative.
A.

Officer Francom Had Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion to Stop the Defendant and
Investigate a Possible Trespass.
Under a level two encounter, a police officer may detain and question any person when

the officer has an objective reasonable, articulable suspicion that person has, is, or is about to be
involved in criminal activity. State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987). To amount to
reasonable, articulable suspicion, the likelihood of criminal activity must be more than a hunch
but need not rise to the level of persuasiveness of probable cause or the preponderance of the
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evidence standard. State v. Alverez, 147P.3d 425 (Utah 2006). State v. Markland, 112 P3d 507,
509-10 (Utah 2005). Further, whether a seizure is reasonable and constitutional does not depend
on whether the defendant is actually guilty of committing a crime but whether the officer has
reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime is being committed. Whether a crime actually
occurred is a question to be determined at trial.
Reasonable, articulable suspicion is supported by an objective analysis of specific,
articulable facts and logical inferences from those facts. Utah v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah
1994). Whether those facts amount to reasonable, articulable suspicion depends upon the totality
of the circumstances, not individual facts viewed in isolation. Markland at 510. Alverez at 432?
To support reasonable, articulable suspicion, an officer may rely on his training, experience, and
subjective belief. Alverez at 432. An officer's suspicion may also be based on information
received from another person if that "tip" bears some indicia of reliability. Id at 433. An officer
may additionally rely on a dispatched report in making an investigatory stop. State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932 at 940 (Utah 1994).
Officer Francom had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the defendant and
investigate a possible trespass. Near midnight, on April Fool's Day, Officer Francom responded
to a complaint that there were people running around in the foothills behind some houses on
Mountain Road. Additionally, the complaint reported a vehicle parked in the Ogden Nature
Center, North (ONCN) parking lot. Complying with his duty to investigate complaints, Officer

In determining whether a police officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion, the courts may not use a "divide
and conquer analysis." In other words, they cannot determine the individual facts in isolation to determine whether
each fact has an innocent explanation. Rather, the courts must look to the :totality of the circumstances" to
determine whether, taken together, the facts warranted further investigation by a police officer. State v. Alverez. at
432.
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Francom arrived to find a car in the ONCN parking lot, thus confirming part of the complaint to
which the officer was responding, thereby showing that the complaint was reliabable.
Two men sat in the car. The parking lot, but for their car, was empty. The trail past the
parking lot was fenced off, both around the parking lot and along Mountain Road, thus indicating
that use of the trail was somewhat restricted and that a certain level of privacy was wanted. Given
the darkness and lateness of the hour, the trail was likely not fit to be hiked upon.3 Given the
lapse of time between the complaining call and Officer Francom's response, the two men in the
car were probably in the dark, empty parking lot for an unreasonable amount of time.
Additionally, given that the trail is only accessible through the entrance in the parking lot where
these two men were parked, coupled with the residential nature of the area and the established
reliability of the complaining call, it is reasonable that these two men could have been the people
running around in the foothills behind houses, alarming the residents.
All these facts and their rational inferences, looked at together as the totality of the
circumstances created a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a trespass had occurred or was
occurring. Further, the possibility that a trespass has occurred or was occurring gave Officer
Francom a duty to investigate.
B.

A Warrants Check on the Defendant Was Within the Reasonable Scope of the
Detention as Part of Officer Francom's Trespass Investigation
Once an officer stops a person for a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime has, is,

or is about to be committed, that detention may continue so long as it is temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. Dietman, 739 P. 2d 616,

3

Additionally, had the two men intended to use the trail for hiking, as it is supposed to be used, they would
have seen the hours of operation immediately after walking through the arbor.
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617 (Utah 1987). For example, running a warrants check on a properly stopped driver does not
exceed the scope of detention, so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention
beyond that reasonably necessary to request a driver's license and valid registration and issue a
citation. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994).
Running a warrants check is an appropriate form of investigation and does not exceed the
scope of detention even if a person is stopped for something other than a traffic violation. State v.
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452 (Utah 1995). In State v. Chapman, the defendant and another
person were parked in an empty school parking lot after dark, late at night. Id. An officer stopped
the defendant for violating a loitering ordinance. Id. The defendant identified himself to the
officer, after which the officer ran a warrants check on the defendant, which came back negative.
Id. The Utah Supreme Court found this stop reasonable because the officer had reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the loitering ordinance was being violated. Id. Additionally, the scope
of the stop was reasonable because, though not a "routine traffic stop," the warrants check was a
reasonable form of investigation that did not "significantly extend the period of detention beyond
that reasonably necessary . . . . " Id.
A warrants check on the defendant was within the reasonable scope of detention as part of
Officer Francom's trespass investigation. Similar to Chapman, wherein a warrants check was
reasonable as part of an investigation for a loitering ordinance violation, it was likewise
reasonable for Officer Francom to investigate a trespass by running a warrants check on the
defendant. Running a warrants check is a valid form of investigation so long as it does not
significantly extend the period of detention, and there is no indication that the defendant was
detained any longer than necessary for the officer to investigate the possible trespass.
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II.
THE OGDEN CITY MUNICIPAL CODE AGAINST TRESPASSING IN CITY PARKS
DOES NOT APPLY TO THE OGDEN NATURE CENTER, NORTH
The Ogden City Municipal Code (OCMC) makes it unlawful for any person to enter or be
upon any city park at any time from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise.1 Ogden City
Ordinance ll-3-2(A). Additionally, that time restriction must be posted at the park's main
entrance.2 Ogden City Ordinance ll-3-2(D).
Neither the Ogden Nature Center (ONC) nor the Ogden Nature Center, North (ONCN)
are a public city park or trail head as neither are listed as public city parks3 or trail heads4 on the
Ogden City website.5 Additionally, the ONC and ONCN are operated by a private, non-profit
company on land that is leased to them by Ogden City. The ONC is not free to public access as
there are limited hours of operation and an entrance fee. Though an annex with no entrance fee,
the ONCN also has limited hours of operation, closed from dusk until dawn. These hours of
operation are posted just past the trail' s entrance.
Because the ONC and ONCN are not public city parks, the criminal trespassing statute6,
and not the OCMC, applies. However, even if the ONCN were a public city park subject to the
OCMC, the reasonableness of a seizure is not determined by whether the ordinance was actually

1

Trespassing on City Parks, Cemeteries, and Golf Courses: A. Parks: "It is unlawful for any person to enter or
be upon any City park at any time from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise, except when
participating in or attending an activity sponsored by the City or allowed under a permit issued by the City, and
except for persons crossing a park on a regularly established walkway." Ogden City Municipal Code 11-3-2(A).
2
Trespassing on City Parks, Cemeteries, and Golf Courses: D. Post of Time Restrictions: "The time restrictions
shall be posted at the main entrance to the park, cemetery, or golf course." Ogden City Municipal Code 11-32(D).
3
List of Ogden City Public Parks: http://www.ogdencityxom/index.php?module=ibcms&ficn=parks.main
4
List of Ogden Trail Networks: http://www.ogdencity.com/mdex.php7module=ibcms&fxn=ogdentrails.main
5
Ogden City website: http://www.ogdencity.com/
Criminal Trespass Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 (2007).
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violated but by whether Office Francom has reasonable, articulable suspicion to think that a
trespass had occurred or was occurring. Whether a trespass actually occurred is a question to be
determined at trial. Because of the reasoanble, articulable suspicion presented by the facts above,
Officer Francom still had a duty to investigate a possible trespass and it is this investigation that
led to the defendant's eventual arrest followed by the discovery of drags on the defendant's
person.
CONCLUSION
First, Officer Francom conducted a constitutional seizure with requisite reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred or was occurring. The complaining call
and its subsequent verification, the car in an otherwise empty parking lot, the lateness and
darkness of the hour, the limited accessibility of the trail coupled with the restriction and privacy
indicated by the surrounding fence, and the otherwise residential nature of the area are all
articulable facts creating a totality of the circumstances from which it can be reasonably inferred
that the two men in the car were not using the parking lot and trail for legitimate purposes and,
thus, that some sort of a criminal activity was occurring-most likely, a trespass.
Second, once Officer Francom had reasonable, articulable suspicion that a trespass had
occurred or was occurring he only detained the defendant as long as necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop. Officer Francom investigated by running a warrants check which is a
legitimate form of investigation for stops, whether they are traffic related or not.
Third, the Ogden City Municipal Code (OCMC) against trespassing does not apply to the
ONCN because the trail is run by a private, non-profit company and it is not considered a public
city park or trail head by Ogden City. Additionally, even if the OCMC against trespassing did
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apply to the ONCN, whether or not a trespass actually occurred is irrelevant. The question,
instead, is whether Office Francom had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that there was ongoing
criminal activity which gave him a duty to investigate.
For the foregoing reasons, the State requests the Court deny Defendant's Motion to
Suppress Evidence. Dated the_l

day of June, 2007.

Mark DeCaria
Deputy Weber County Attorney
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thereby certify that I mailed or hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing on
t h i s ^ X ^ j a y of June, 2007, a copy of the STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE to:
Michael D. Bouwhuis
Attorney for the Defendant
2564 Washington Blvd., Suit 201
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 393-6452
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